Learning proper use of drugs in the home These standards can be applied for the community, but not for individuals, whose occasional idiosyncrasies are never easy to predict. It is minimized drug hazard. Even without more reliable statistics it is likely that much could be achieved by the methods listed in Table 2 ' The generally accepted view is that a man has a right to risk his own health and safety; if this is so, presumably the duty of the employer and the industrial physician is to ensure that the employee is fully aware of the risks he is accepting' (Norman 1960) . This is an unqualified statement of an ideal applicable not simply to work, but also to leisure activity and manner of living: each man or woman fully informed of the possibilities for risk in what he or she is doing and making the conscious decision that for him or her the risk is worth the trade-off. But why, if so, do doctors ignore the ideal and try so much persuasion, for example when they see adults overeating or drinking to excess or smoking cigarettes? And why is there so much legislation to reduce the possibilities of people hurting themselves? It is, of course, impossible for any individual to be fully informed about all the risks he might run. Our society also expects to meet the consequences of an individual's risk-taking and might wish to economize on the costswidows and orphaned children are supported, the NHS takes free care of the injured, others are even -expected to risk their lives in mountain rescue teams or in police cars or ambulances on motorways. But underlying these reasoned arguments is a feeling we surely all have that people need to be, and should be, protected from themselves, adults as well as children. There are some kinds of risk and levels of risks we are not willing to accept for other people, even when they are mature and informed, and, correspondingly, th6re must be risks at some lower level which we do accept for others. Can anything. be said about the kind or level of risk which decides which of these two attitudes we adopt and whether our professional attitudes differ from those of the man in the street or of ourselves when outside a professional context? There is often a striking difference between the freedom we allow ourselves (including sometimes our families) and the more stringent limits we 'think ought to apply to other people. Leisure activities are often much more risky than occupations (Pochin 1974). We drive cars ourselves but expect a higher standard of safety as a passenger in some form of public transport. The accident death rate per year per 108 miles travelled in Great Britain 1965-69 was 1.6 for car drivers and about the same for car passengers, but eight-fold less, 0.21, for passengers in public service vehicles (PSV, buses and coaches) (Millard 1971) . In the USA passenger death rate per passenger mile is about two orders of magnitude higher for private aeroplanes than for scheduled air lines (National Safety Council 1974) . The greater safety of public, as compared with private, transport must be the result of imposing regulations on operating companies and their operatives more onerous than we accept for ourselves. One underlying reason may be personal attitudes to the fun of driving oneself or to drinking. However much these may affect what magistrates and juries decide in court when considering individual cases, they are not likely to affect in the same way the setting in committee of regulations for the safety of public transport.
One important concept is that of negligible risk, a risk which in practice is ignored, even by those well informed about it. It is greater than zero but, because it is ignored, does not require statement in numerical terms (cf. Knox 1975) . It may not be acceptable, however, in all circumstances.
No one who is informed would regard differences in level of background radiation within this country as involving differences in radiations risk which are greater than negligible. For reasons which seem good to other people, civil servants are being encouraged to move away from SE England, where natural background radiation over chalk and river alluvium is as low as anywhere in this country, to other places some of which will have higher levels of background. A fortiori experiments on volunteers for medical purposes which involve radiation exposure perhaps 50-100 times smaller, corresponding to geographical differences in the annual dose from natural background, not the lifetime's dose, should also be regarded as involving a risk which is truly negligible. A corollary, which may be argued, is the extent to which a risk which is negligible needs explaining, either to civil servants or to volunteers. Children, unlike adults, cannot legally be volunteers for experiments because they cannot give valid consent to the acceptance of risk, even negligible risk, but there is no corresponding restriction on civil servants being accompanied by their families when transferred to live in areas of higher background. The difference between the two cases, especially in relation to the acceptability of irradiation of children, must lie either in a difference in the degree to which politicians, trades union officials and senior civil servants on the one hand and 10 medical research workers on the other are fully informed about the carcinogenic potentialities of low level radiation, or in some qualitative difference in their respective purposes. There is also an interesting contrast between attitudes to controlled medical experimentation on children's bodies and uncontrolled educational experimentation on children's minds and emotions, a field where rio one seems to ask if the children, or their parents, consent, or if the risks are greater than negligible. However, as Knox (1975) pointed out, consistency cannot be expected until after agreement on principles.
What is the boundary between negligible risk, that which is ignored, and more than negligible, what might be called perceived risk. After examining a number of examples of everyday risk to which greater or lesser attention is paid Knox (1975) suggested that the limits of personal concern for severe injury are usually in the order of 1/100 000 in a lifetime, or a little greater, smaller risks being ignored: examples of this which relate to acceptability of risks for others are listed in Table 1 . The lowest traffic accident risk against which action is taken, the placing of crash barriers on the central reservations of motorways, may illustrate how dramatic aspects can modify quantitatively our attitudes to negligibility of risk. These barriers would reduce car passenger and driver deaths by less than 1 % overall and cost-benefit analysis suggested that their justification is questionable (Moore & Jehu 1968). A less detailed assessment from the USA implied that there is slight concern about, but fatalistic acceptance of, risk at the slightly higher level of accidental death per million persons per
year, but that a death risk of 10-7 per year is negligible (Starr et al. 1972 gives 20-25 as the expected reduction in number of deaths for the whole motorway system per year.
The risk given in the table is this number x 70 years divided by 50 million, the population of Great Britain Yet a truly negligible level of risk as far as the individual is concerned may mean a large number of casualties if every member of a large population is exposed to it (Mole 1975 ). An individual risk of 10-6 applied to the population of Great Britain would mean 50 casualties. However rarely 50 deaths might occur all at once, it would be a matter of great public concern when it happened. Degree of concern about particular kinds of risk is certainly greatly magnified by the immediacy of television pictures and by the reporting habits of the media but special concern about a simultaneously occurring group of casualties may possibly be determined not only by social conventions but also by a basic human characteristic with evolutionary advantages and therefore not eradicable by reason and information. Negligibility of risk is a useful and probably indispensable concept when considering the individual, but socially acceptable seems preferable to socially negligible as the corresponding term for society. Risks which are accepted for other people ought to be socially acceptable: their magnitude must depend on social conventions and associated benefits but upper limits may be set merely by the magnitude of the risk considered in isolation.
Safety Standards
In the field of ionizing radiation the basic hypothesis is that any dose, however small, carries with it a definite probability, greater than zero, of cancer induction, and, if the gonads are affected, a definite probability, greater than zero, of hereditary effects in future generations. When the working hypothesis is that there is no threshold, as in the radiation field, setting a basic safety standard in terms of exposure levels thereby states a level of risk which is acceptable. This is also true whatever the working hypothesis relating exposure and effect, if a statement of a safety standard allows explicitly for some frequency of effect in those exposed to it, for instance the threshold limit value (TLV) for byssinosis or asbestosis. Experts are an essential part of the decision-taking machinery but the decisions should not be left to them alone (Medical Research Council 1975) . Nevertheless, however elaborate and conscientious the process of consultation, there will always be, so it seems to me, some element of decision by proxy about the level of risk which is acceptable to others.
Safety standards are in operation now for exposure of the general public to ionizing radiation. Doubtless other safety standards for the public will be provided in the future by the Health and Safety Commission, which has a general responsibility towards the public who might be affected by activities at work. In each case the Commission, when promulgating a standard, will be determining an acceptable level of risk for other people. The only exception will be when the claim is made that the exposure level permitted by the standard is below that at which any effect at all will occur in a large population. Whether or not the risk is detectable or measurable is beside the point.
Safety standards for drinking water and for food were laid down largely to prevent bacterial disease and acute poisoning by chemical agents, effects with an easily recognized impact in the public mind. It is the expert concerned for others, not the general public, who exerts himself over the possibilities of mutagens or carcinogens in diet, drugs, cosmetics and the environment generally. The premise of legislation in some countries is absolute safety: is it sensible to aim for more than reducing risk to the level of socially acceptable ?
Risksfrom Accidents as a Guide to Social Acceptability The risk of accidental injury may be wholly or partly a matter of personal choice, as on each occasion we cross the road or decide whethet to hold the bannister while coming downstairs. Acts of God and catastrophes like Flixborough are rare and I can think of only one common circumstance of everyday life where the risk of injury by accident may be determined entirely by factors outwith our own control, viz. being a passenger in some form of public transport. I do not recall any public suggestion that these risks are generally too' high at the present time. On the contrary there would be common agreement that bus and rail travel in this country is safe. Does the casualty rate for passengers in public transport provide an objective measure of the level of socially acceptable risk which may be used as a yardstick when accepting risks for other people'! No common definition of injury is used when collecting information on casualties in road, rail and aeroplane passengers. For both rail and PSV the reported injury rate is one to two orders of magnitude greater than the death rate, but death is the only kind of injury for which unambiguous statistics are available.
The most relevant information, that for injury completely unaffected by personal choice, would be about death arising from an accident to a vehicle in motion. Less relevant is injury while getting on or off a vehicle, since a common contributory factor then is an action or decision by the individual concerned. Information on deaths of PSV passengers is available only for these two kinds of circumstance combined. About one-third of them follow accidents when entering or alighting (R F Newby, 1974, personal communication) so that the total rate is a reliable 1 10 Proc. roy. Soc. Med. Volume 69 February 1976 enough guide to death caused by f outside personal control. Data a available for deaths of railway pas 'train accidents' (vehicles in motio wholly passive) and from 'trair (passengers entering or alighting falling out of carriages, being hit stations, &c.). Accident deaths wl or disembarking from aeroplanes sei uncommon. Thus comparisons b( by air and by rail can be made witi death rates wholly independent factors and dependent solely on th dards of others.
Over a period of forty years the c passenger mile for American and Bril air services has decreased exponentia of 70-80 and is now slightly less travel, which in contrast has hardly thirty years in the USA (Fig 1) . Se per fatality are much more numerous than for air travel so that, in terms c per mile, travel by air is now consi than by bus. Will air travel continue safety at the same kind of rate and Before the end of this century the would then be an order of magn than for bus travel, and the risk of perhaps two to three orders of mz What is the nature of the driving the improvement in air safety? actors wholly penalty of losing expensive aeroplanes, the greater Ire separately emotional impact of a single airplane crash as ssengers from compared with a number of bus accidents, the on, passengers greater proportion of people of influence amongst movement' airline passengers as compared with more from trains, mundane forms of transport (at any rate in the by trains at past), or simply that air transport began more hen boarding recently so that its general approach to safety is em to be very less traditional and more sophisticated than for Dtween travel road transport ? iout error for
In Great Britain British Rail has for long been of personal a nationalized concern with safety as an explicit e safety stan-management objective. Yet the reduction in death rate for rail passengers has been relatively death risk per modest, 2-3 fold over 30-40 years of unremitting tish scheduled effort (Fig 1) , a much smaller factor than for air Mly by a factor travel, and possibly due in part to improvements than for bus in post-accident care. The death rate for train changed over accidents, where passengers' actions have no rious injuries effect at all on the probability of accident and for bus travel very little if any effect on whether the injury )f overall risk received will be fatal, is several times smaller and iderably safer fell in a parallel manner but more erratically to improve in (Fig 1) . Fluctuations would be expected, because 1, if so, why ? severe train accidents occur rarely and the number risk of death killed per accident is highly variable. A death rate Litude smaller for rail travel which changes so slowly over the serious injury years will suggest to the dispassionate observer agnitude less. that it must be broadly acceptable to the general force behind public: otherwise British Rail would have been the economic faced with public pressure to reduce accident rates. As it is, it is clearly the experts in British Rail and the Railway Inspectorate who have a GREAT BRITAI maintained concern (Inspector of Railway Accidents 1971).
The death rate for rail travel in the USA decreased from 1950 to 1965, when it was smaller than in Great Britain, and then suddenly increased (Fig 1) . If this increase is not an illustration of the variability already noted, the pattern of datã assuming that annual rates do not change with time. 2 It is also remarkable how constant casualty rates have been amongst the work force of another nationalized industry with an explicit and determined commitment to safety, the National Coal Board. Over the past thirty years the death rate per shift from accident has been reduced by less than a factor of 2 and the serious reportable injury rate per shift by perhaps 10% (Fig 2) . The diagnosis rate of new cases of pneumoconiosis seems also to have changed little over the past few years (National Coal Board 1972). It seems difficult to deny that relative constancy of casualty rates over a long period of time implies social acceptability, even if technical experts continue to work to reduce them and even if the underlying reason is no more than indifference to something traditional. Failure to inform is not an explanation since casualty numbers and rates have always been given in the National Coal Board annual reports.
The death rate from accidents at home involving electricity or gas is at a rate between 10-6 and 10-5 per member of the population per year (an order of magnitude higher in the elderly for gas accidents), or about 10-4 over a lifetime. Only a small fraction of the total is the result of failure of installations regulated by statute or code of practice: the great majority of the cases are the result of individual risk taking. There seems to be no public concern about the inadequacy of the safety regulations provided for the installation of electricity and gas supplies in the home and this confirms that a death rate of 10-1-10-5 in a lifetime from factors outside personal control is socially acceptable. The higher rates from accidents with and misuse of electrical and gas appliances are a matter of concern but commonly result from individual risk taking.
Criteriafor Social Acceptability The medical scientist naturally assesses level of risk in terms of the probability of risk to the individual (cf. Pochin 1974) . Is this the quantitative aspect of risk which signifies acceptability to the man in the street? A number of examples of what seem broadly acceptable risks have been mentioned, acceptable in the sense that, much as they may be regretted when attention is drawn to them, the risk has been fairly-steady for many years and does not seem to have been the occasion for much public concern. These included fatal accidents during passenger travel by bus or train (Fig 1) , in coal mines (Fig 2) , and arising from faulty installation of electricity or gas supplies in the home. In these cases the risk to the individual in the population at risk covered a wide numerical range from 10-6 to more than 10-4 per year. Such wide differences in risk on a logarithmic scale like this seem almost, if not quite, impossible to appreciate intuitively, even by the highly numerate. Thus a rate calculated in terms of risk per million persons per year may be meaningful as a means of comparison only for the sophisticated.
Risk per hour of exposure is a useful index when considering leisure activities like rock climbing or canoeing which involve short bursts of activity (cf. Sowby 1965) and, although its use has been extended to quite other circumstances (Starr et al. 1972) , it seems an inadequate general criterion for assessing lifetime risks from maintained causes or from rare events. The casualty rate per occasion of risk seems to approximate much more closely to intuitive assessments of riskiness. There must be on average 105-106 occasions of going downstairs in a lifetime and as many occasions of crossing the road, 103-105 occasions of making a journey by rail, car or bus and perhaps 100-102 occasions of making a journey by aeroplane (Table 2) . Nowadays the risk of death per passenger mile for Great Britain and for the USA is about the same for travel by bus, rail or aeroplane (Table 2, Fig 1) but aeroplanes feel far more dangerous to many actual or potential passengers and they do provide much the highest risk per journey. In the UK the relative fatality risk per journey in 1965-69 was in round terms as 500:5:1 for travel by air, rail or bus respectively (Table 2) . Nevertheless, the risk per journey even for air travel is very low, only 2 x 10-6 in the 1970s. It is difficult to imagine that there can be any intuitive assessment of differences between risk per occasion in the range 10-9-10-6, although Sowby (1965) did discuss ways in which an individual might use risk estimates to determine his choice of one kind of transport rather than another for a particular purpose. Moreover the concept of occasions of risk does not seem directly applicable to risks which arise only occasionally in a given lifetime, such as from failure of buildings or electricity or gas installations.
An empirically more consistent feature in relation to acceptability by the man in the street may be the total number of casualties. Numbers of deaths which seem to be acceptable are 100 or less per year as shown by the data for passenger travel by road or rail (Table 2) . Faults in the installation of electrical wiring in the home cause 10 or fewer deaths per year from electrocution (Electrical Adviser 1970-73) and perhaps twice that number after fires (Building Research Establishment 1972) . Deaths from these causes as a result of individual risk-taking with electrical and gas appliances exceed 100 per year. The annual number of deaths from gas accidents is greater than 300 but may be less than 100 when individual risk-taking is discounted, in agreement with what is being suggested; but the larger number of 400-500 accidental deaths from drugs is probably of doubtful acceptability, like the similar number of road deaths of drivers of PSV or of goods vehicles. Numbers exceeding 1000 per year, as for drivers or passengers in cars, are clearly not wholly acceptable to public opinion because, in spite of active opposition to safety measures like seat-belts and anti-drinking penalties, there is a maintained and expensive campaign to reduce casualties by road improvements.
These are all risks of everyday life and confirmatory evidence for the suggestion that acceptability depends simply on numbers may possibly be found in occupational mortality. It is generally agreed that coal mining is risky work but, in spite of the high and maintained individual risk (Fig 2, Pochin 1974) , there seems to be relatively little public concern during the long intervals between rare dramatic accidents. The total number of accidental deaths per year in the industry is less than 100. For the sake of comparability all these examples have been given in terms of numbers of casualties over the same period of time but the unit used, the year, has no basic significance. The fact of social acceptability is not affected by whether numbers are summed over a week, a year or a lifetime.
There are, of course, individually dramatic occurrences when a great deal of attention is paid to single deaths, for example after walking through sulphuric acid spilt on the road following an accident to a tanker or from H2S. poisoning after dumping chemical wastes at a tip. These are quite exceptional, however, and do not disprove the general thesis proposed for everyday risks where normally little or no attention is paid to single deaths. The motorway crash barrier example discussed earlier may lie in the intermediate zone between single dramatic occurrences and more everyday events. In the exceptional cases the amount of attention may reflect either the drama of the particular occasion or the existence of pressure groups ready to capitalize on the chance occurrence of a single death in particular circumstances to further the measures they have been advocating all along.
These empirical observations may suggest that there is indeed an objective criterion for the level of risk which could be regarded as acceptable for others, a given number of deaths of a definable kind. If so acceptability would depend absolutely on the classification of fatalities into categoriesgrouping would increase numbers in a category, subdivision decrease themand also on what was perceived as a reference population.
The required classification would also depend on the perceptions of the man in the street. Clear differences are likely to be perceived between travel fatalities by road, rail and air and also between deaths in the home from electricity and from gas. For example, the former would not be aggregated into a single class of transport accident nor the latter into a single class of accidents relating to delivery of energy in the home, however useful each of those broad categories might be to government departments or in cost-benefit analyses. Is it not the case that the elderly are already singled out in the public mind as a category at special risk from both electricity and gas and from falls in the home, and that less concern is caused by a given number of deaths in the elderly than in the young? It is not at all clear whether the size of the reference population or its social structure would affect the numbers of casualties perceived as socially acceptable or not acceptable. Another special factor associated with air travel, additional to those mentioned earlier, may be that the reference population is much larger than that of a single country. Information about air accidents all over the world is news.
In most contexts death is much less common than injury followed by physical or mental handicap endured for a lifetime. It seems impossible at the present time to assess social attitudes to serious injury as compared with death (to which all the data refer) since even experts are uninformed about the lifetime sequeli of serious injury. For example, there seem to be no data on the proportion of coalminers suffering serious reportable injury who return to their pre-accident occupation, let alone on the proportion of passengers suffering severe travel accident injury whose subsequent earning capacity or enjoyment of life is decreased.
Evidence rather than presumptions is needed, especially about the variation in attitudes between different people in different circumstances, before consistent and generally applicable conclusions could be reached about the social acceptability of risks, something explicitly or implicitly integral to the setting of safety standards.
